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Mateo Taussig-Rubbo

Pirate Trials, the International Criminal Court, and Mob
Justice: Reﬂections on Postcolonial Sovereignty in Kenya
But jurisdiction is not merely an ambit or sphere (better
described in this case as ‘‘competence’’); it is basically—as is
visible from the Latin origin of the word itself, jurisdictio—a
legal power, hence necessarily a legitimate power, ‘‘to state
the law’’ (dire le droit) within this ambit, in an authoritative and
ﬁnal manner.
—Prosecutor v. Tadic1

Jurisdiction is typically understood in relation to territory or nationality.2 This conceptualization complements a global order of separate sovereign states, each enjoying the
power to judge within its territory and to create law for its citizens. Universal jurisdiction, by contrast, entails the ability to judge offenders who have no connection to
the state sitting in judgment. Decoupled from territory and nationality, the exercise
of universal jurisdiction raises the question of whether it undermines a global order of
sovereign states by allowing one state to reach into the affairs of another. This question
is underscored by the crimes that, in the twentieth century, were found to give rise to
universal jurisdiction, such as crimes against humanity that, in one common formulation, ‘‘shock the conscience’’ of mankind. There is an apparent tension between a
global order of state sovereignty and the exercise of universal jurisdiction that either
promises to curb sovereign abuses or threatens to conceal imperial meddling behind a
judicial façade.
There are, however, other ways in which the relation between state sovereignty
and universal jurisdiction might be construed. For instance, the ﬁgure of the pirate,
the original object of universal jurisdiction, suggests a different relationship. The
pirate acts in a zone beyond sovereignty—the high seas—and acts not on a sovereign’s
behalf. The exercise of universal jurisdiction in prosecuting piracy thus seems to
complement a global order of territorial states. The pirate was hostis humani generis,
the enemy of all mankind, or at least the enemy of the state system.3 Conversely, the
perpetrator of crimes against humanity—the modern enemy of all mankind—often
claims to act in the name of the state. Presented thus, we have two distinct conceptions
of the relationship between sovereignty and universal jurisdiction.
Over the past few years in Kenya, various stories have unfolded side by side that
provide a more nuanced illustration of the ways that sovereignty and universal jurisdiction interact. On the one hand, Kenya has been unable to establish a domestic
process to punish the political and business elites said to be behind the vicious ethnic
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violence occasioned by the contested election in 2007. In response, the prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has initiated proceedings on his own motion
and asserted his intention to prosecute a handful of perpetrators for crimes against
humanity. On the other hand, over roughly the same time period, starting in 2006,
Kenya has accepted delivery of and begun prosecuting Somali pirates captured by the
naval forces of various wealthy states on the high seas, asserting its universal jurisdiction over them. For a moment, then, we have in Kenya both the oldest and one of
the newest objects of universal jurisdiction. Even as Kenya imports the original
‘‘enemy of all’’—the pirate—it prepares to export to The Hague the new ‘‘enemy of
all’’—the perpetrator of crimes against humanity.
How should we understand this conjunction in Kenya? Does the profound tension
produced by the dual appearance of ﬁgures from such different historical moments
constitute a contradiction? Are the two stories expressive of different understandings
of sovereignty and global order, or do they ﬁt together as a coherent whole? Is the
twentieth-century extension of universal jurisdiction from piracy to crimes against
humanity expressive of the roughly contemporaneous decoupling of formal sovereignty from power after World War II and decolonization? Drawing on brief visits to
Kenya in 2008, 2009, and 2010, including ﬁrsthand observations of pirate trials in
Mombasa, I take up these questions. The abstract problem of the relation between
universal jurisdiction and state sovereignty should be localized and theorized, I
suggest, in relation to the postcolonial African sovereign state, its relations with more
wealthy states, and its relation to its own citizenry.
The importing of pirates and exporting of criminals against humanity are not the
only instances in Kenya where we can trace the intermeshing of state sovereignty and
universal jurisdiction. Indeed, in order to establish a baseline from which to contemplate the co-presence of the ICC and the pirate trials, we must consider the degree
and manner in which the Kenyan state has jurisdiction over Kenya. I attempt to do
this through a consideration of a third feature of law and punishment internal to
Kenya but external to the Kenyan state: ‘‘mob justice,’’ which consists in the beating
and occasional killing of accused miscreants by a spontaneously assembled group.
Mob justice evokes some of the texture of everyday life in much of Kenya, where state
institutions fail to provide security, where individuals feel beset by crime with little
police protection, where, in sum, Kenya seems unable to carry out some of its most
important domestic sovereignty functions. The claim of the mob to deliver justice,
and the notion that everyone is empowered to punish, should, I suggest, be seen as a
form of universal jurisdiction enjoyed by the mob over this other ‘‘enemy of all.’’
Each of my three cases illustrates a distinct way in which postcolonial sovereignty
is compromised from the vantage point of classical conceptions of state sovereignty.
By promoting Kenya as a venue for pirate trials, wealthier states are using its postcolonial jurisdiction to displace their own (arguably nontransferable) obligations to prosecute pirates. At the same time, the postcolonial state is not without some bargaining
power—haggling, for instance, over the cost of Kenya’s cooperation. In the ICC legal
process, we can see another challenge to state sovereignty, one that seems to fall principally on postcolonial—and especially African—states. But formal sovereignty is
preserved in both the pirate trials and the ICC, since Kenyan consent is part of both
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cases. Mob justice, however, evokes a state failing in its sovereign domestic obligations.
A comparison of these three cases reveals some interesting parallels: like the ICC, mob
justice asserts its legitimacy as arising from the failure of the Kenyan state; like mob
justice, the pirate trial concerns the right of any actor to punish the ‘‘enemy of all.’’
Rather than catalogue how one state perhaps falls short of an international ideal,
my primary interest is in two other themes. The ﬁrst entails questions about who has
jurisdiction—understood in a general sense as the right to speak the law. Each of the
three instances entails a creative uncertainty about who is speaking, which I describe,
following the suggestion of Joseph Slaughter, as ‘‘juris ventriloquism’’ and throwing
the sovereign voice.4 In a sense, ‘‘ventriloquism’’ is involved whenever individuals act
in some ofﬁcial capacity to enact, interpret, or apply the law. Indeed, persons exercising powers delegated to them are expected not to be speaking for themselves but to
be expressing the will of the people, the legislator, reason, god, or some other source
of law. Ventriloquism in the cases I discuss stands out because of the uncertainties
about who is speaking and about who (or what) is imagined to legitimate that speech.
The notions of ventriloquism and throwing the sovereign voice help articulate the
question of whether some other state, or even humanity, is speaking through Kenya
and the judges in the pirate trials. At the ICC, the prosecutor speaks for humanity
and justice, but also, with some license, for the Kenyan state; in this sense, the state
might be said to ‘‘speak’’ against itself. In the mob, the sovereign right to punish is
decoupled from mediating institutions such as courts and prisons. Mob justice might
be read as a claim to enact justice directly, and in this sense the mob purports to be a
direct agent of justice, not its institutionally mediated ‘‘ventriloquist.’’
Putting these instances together, we might say that Kenya is performing a ventriloquist role for an international community, in perhaps a worthy undertaking of global
cooperation. But when it seems most important for the state to serve as the voice of
its citizenry and enforce its laws, Kenya seems to have grave difﬁculty doing so.
Kenyan state ofﬁcers, we are told, too often, through personal corruption, ‘‘speak for
themselves’’ not for the public. In sum, the Kenyan state seems to ﬁnd it easier to
speak for humanity than to speak for Kenyans.
The second theme concerns the relation between law, land, and sea. With respect
to the seas, we can discern a ‘‘reterritorialization’’ of the sovereignty-free zone as states
seek to extend their control over the high seas with exclusive economic zones, new
rules for archipelagic states, longer deﬁnitions of territorial waters, and the global
reach of the U.S. military.5 Going in the other direction, and echoing older European
notions of precolonial polities, there is also a process of what we might call the ‘‘oceaniﬁcation’’ of land, whereby many postcolonial states are treated as sovereignty-less,
‘‘ungoverned territories,’’ in language adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense.6
Indeed, the sea often seems to be a more governed zone and site of sovereign control
than land. These dynamics are at play in Somalia and, in less obvious ways, in Kenya.
Can we think of the current conjuncture of events in Kenya as, in somewhat poetic
terms, the international law version of global sea level rise, the sovereignty-less sea
swallowing up the sovereign on land?7 Floating in on that tide, preserving the ‘‘sovereignty-free’’ status of the seas, is the U.S. navy and now, at least off the coast of
Somalia, the Chinese navy as well. This theme and the notion of juris ventriloquism

Taussig-Rubbo: Pirate Trials, the International Criminal Court, and Mob Justice

................. 17987$

$CH5

02-14-11 15:50:06

PS

PAGE 53

53

both draw our attention to shifting relations between jurisdiction and a global spatial
order.
Postcolonial Sovereignty

One of the hallmarks of political modernity is the relocation of political sovereignty
from the divine authority of God and King to the secular realm of the People. In an
essay on the arrest of Augusto Pinochet, Paul Kahn articulates this conception of
sovereignty in the context of universal jurisdiction: ‘‘In a democratic regime in
particular, sovereignty and law are tightly linked: the sovereign people govern through
the rule of law; and by following the law, citizens participate in popular sovereignty
and achieve self-government.’’8 Such notions of popular, ‘‘internal’’ sovereignty
presuppose, however, that a political community has meaningful autonomy independent of an international order of states.
By contrast, colonialism ofﬁcially dictated a conception of sovereignty as external,
as something—a gift or imposition—from abroad. The decades following World War
II ushered in a transformation from a regime of formal inequality between European
sovereigns and various others—colonies, trusteeships, etc.—to an emergent postwar
United Nations order of formal sovereign equality.9 Decolonization was by no means
the simple extension of Westphalian sovereignty to previously colonized peoples.
Through independence and decolonization, postcolonial states assumed sovereign
status and afﬁrmed the notion that sovereignty comes from within, from their people.
From this perspective the process of decolonization entails the transformation of externally dependent sovereignty into an ‘‘internal’’ conception of independent state sovereignty. In practice, however, the political experience of decolonization left most
postcolonial states, including Kenya, in a situation of only partially realized internalization of sovereignty.10 Thus, we are often told that new states such as Kenya are not
really made of a ‘‘people’’ but rather are made of diverse peoples lumped together for
the colonists’ convenience; that the new states have remained colonialist in some
respect and do not act in the interests of their populations; that, despite decolonization, rich states continue to exploit former colonies, and thus the new states are not
sovereign in any meaningful sense; that the new states are funded by foreign sources,
and thus are really vehicles for outside interests.11 In sum, because decolonization did
not entail a transformation in the global distribution of political and economic power,
formal legal sovereignty masks an ongoing inability to create an autonomous political
order.
In Robert Jackson’s study of the decoupling of legal form from political reality,
the postcolonial state is a ‘‘quasi-state’’—an entity enjoying the legal trappings of
sovereignty secured by the international order but not possessing the empirical features
of sovereignty, such as genuine political power, the ability to govern or to defend
itself. Internationally, the new sovereigns enjoy ‘‘negative’’ and juridical sovereignty,
not ‘‘positive’’ and actual sovereignty.12 Sovereignty in the postcolony remains a kind
of gift bestowed from above, that is, from the metropole. An alternative, more
economically oriented argument is that the postcolonial state is essentially a victim of
new forms of neocolonial extraction, or that structural adjustment and aid have
emerged as indirect ways for metropolitan powers to govern former colonial, now
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nominally sovereign spaces. Yet both the ‘‘gift’’ and neocolonial ‘‘larceny’’ views
concur in suggesting that the legal order of formally sovereign postcolonial states—on
the domestic and international levels—is not descriptive of actual practices and a lived
order of compromised postcolonial sovereignty.
This decoupling of legal sovereignty from a lived political order in the postcolony
is also the moment of the rise of the UN, the United States and the USSR, and the
Cold War. The same era also saw the rise of ‘‘humanity’’ as a presence beyond the
immanent order of the state in international law and relations. According to one
international tribunal, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) initiated a
process by which a ‘‘State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach.’’13 The rise of the human being and
the demise of the sovereign state in international affairs are certainly overstated, but it
seems important to consider how these developments operate together. In the
conjunction of current international events in Kenya, we see various symptoms of the
transformation that turned the formerly colonized state into a formally sovereign state,
as well as various processes that are currently redeﬁning the notion of sovereignty.
Pirate Trials

In the early modern period, piracy was in many cases a state-sponsored affair. In their
struggle against Iberian supremacy and its assertion of trade monopoly in the Americas
and the East, for example, the British and the Dutch made common use of pirates.14
When operating with a license from a sovereign, pirates were, at least according to
that sovereign, not pirates but privateers.15 Piracy also referred to non-European
‘‘indigenous’’ coastal communities who resisted the European imposition of trade
monopoly in their waters.16 Likewise, the Barbary ‘‘pirates,’’ whom the United States
confronted shortly after independence, acted on behalf of various Muslim North
African cities and hence could be thought of as corsairs or privateers.17 Additionally,
the British captured slave traders and tried them for piracy, asserting that this could
be done under the ‘‘law of nations.’’ (This innovation was also disputed: slavers, after
all, had long been integral parts of the global system.18) One thing we see, then, is
that piracy was part of the struggle to deﬁne a global order, a working out of whose
violence is that of a sovereign, and whose is piratical and private.
While sponsoring pirates was expedient to a weak and developing English state
that lacked the funds to pay up-front for a large navy, the consolidation of British sea
power obviated the need to sponsor such characters. With the transformation of the
British military into a formal not-for-proﬁt public service entity, the function and
violence of privateers was brought ‘‘in-house,’’ under direct control of the modern
state.19 Thus, modern-state navies were tasked with eradicating piracy. The historian
Marcus Rediker describes the British-led campaign to eradicate piracy in the eighteenth century as an ‘‘international campaign of terror.’’20 In London, New York,
Boston, Port Royal, Providence, Cape Coast Castle, and Salvador ‘‘authorities staged
spectacular executions of those who had committed sea banditry.’’ Arriving in port,
one would see the ‘‘gibbeted corpse of one who had sailed under the black ﬂag, ﬂesh
rotting, crows picking at the bones.’’ By the early nineteenth century, piracy had been
largely suppressed.
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The current outbreak of piracy around the Horn of Africa provokes a reconsideration of the modernist narrative of the consolidation of the state’s monopoly on
violence, and it has met a different response from the one recounted by Rediker.21
The collapse of the Cold War–ﬁnanced Somali military state in 1991 is a central factor
in the rise of piracy in the area. Although Somalia is now the archetype of a ‘‘failed’’
state, the origins of piracy there are often traced to the practice of repelling foreign
ﬁshing vessels from Somali waters and, perhaps paradoxically, to the practice of selling
licenses—often on old government letterhead—to foreign vessels for access to Somali
waters.22 Piracy has evolved into a far-reaching enterprise, with support sometimes
provided by the Somali diaspora and a ‘‘business model’’ in which pirates receive
payment based on different kinds of ‘‘shares.’’23 A document recovered from one
‘‘company’’ of pirates describes a new ‘‘merit-based reward’’ of U.S. $2,000: ‘‘The
company will continue its reward system and it is open to all. As the saying goes ‘the
parents initially love their children equally but it is the children who make them love
some more than the others’. So does the company. It is up to your abilities to qualify
this easy-to-earn reward [sic].’’24 At the time of writing, there are about twenty vessels
being held in Somalia, and the price of ransom is typically in the U.S. $1–2 million
range.25 Thus, this is neither snatch-and-grab piracy common in the Malacca straits,
nor capture for resale or personal use. As a matter of everyday practice, deals with
Somali pirates are often carried out in a business-like manner.
The collapse of the Somali state has given rise to three more or less distinct regions,
each with different connections to piracy. Somaliland, in the northwest, is relatively
stable, holds elections, and is said to be helping with counterpiracy efforts and to be
eager to conduct pirate trials in its own courts.26 Somaliland has declared itself independent, but has not been internationally recognized as a sovereign and clearly hopes
that its cooperation will bolster claims for international recognition.27 Puntland, on
the Horn, has been accused of supporting piracy.28 To the south, the severe law-andorder government of the Union of Islamic Courts suppressed piracy, but this group’s
overthrow by the United States and Ethiopia in 2006 led to an increase in piracy. It
also led to the rise of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (commonly known as alShabaab, ‘‘the Youth’’).29 There is speculation that al-Shabaab proﬁts from piracy, but
a UN monitor states that there is ‘‘no evidence’’ of ‘‘structured cooperation’’ between
the group and pirates,30 and al-Shabaab has sometimes attacked pirates for interfering
with trade from the ports it controls.31 With the collapse of central state power, there
is no internationally recognized Somali sovereign with the capacity to license or
authorize the pirates, much less to transform their private violence into the public
violence of the privateer or the navy—as, for instance, the English did in the eighteenth century.
In response to this growth in Somali piracy, an international naval ﬂotilla has
congregated off East Africa—including French, U.S., Russian, Indian, and British
warships. Dealing with pirates is also serving as a coming out party for the navies of
newly prominent states: for the ﬁrst time since the ﬁfteenth century, Chinese naval
vessels were seen outside of East Asia. In addition, the UN Security Council has passed
a number of resolutions (under Chapter VII) that might be read as redeﬁning Somali
sovereignty in that they allow other states to pursue pirates not only in international
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waters but into Somali waters as well, something that clearly worries other states with
piracy problems, such as Indonesia.32 Those resolutions contemplate that the ﬁght
against piracy will be conducted not only on the high seas but ‘‘in’’ Somalia—that is,
in its territorial sea and on its land. Although the resolutions require the formal
consent of Somalia, the Somali government (the Transitional Federal Government) is
itself largely the creation of the international community and its writ within Somalia
barely extends outside the presidential compound in Mogadishu.33 In this
arrangement, we see the two themes I wish to highlight: juris ventriloquism, whereby
powerful states seem to speak through a lesser ‘‘sovereign,’’ and the oceaniﬁcation of
land, whereby the sovereignty of land is no longer counterpoised to the sovereigntyfree high seas; rather, like the sea, land becomes an ‘‘open’’ space.
The intersection of trends in the shipping industry and the distribution of naval
power helps to explain why conventional forms of jurisdiction are not available.
Commercial ships must be registered with and ﬂy the ﬂag of a state. On board, the
law of that state applies, and the state exercises jurisdiction over the ship for various
purposes. But ships need not ﬂy the ﬂag of their true owner or crew; they may, in
essence, have their own ‘‘nationality.’’34 About half of merchant ships ﬂy so-called
ﬂags of convenience, typically Panama, Liberia, or the Bahamas, states that have more
lenient requirements with regard to labor and safety regulations and hence lower
costs.35 In addition, crews are often from non-Western and poorer countries, such as
the Philippines. This migration of crew and ship nationality toward marginal and
poorer states, and the fact that naval power is the possession of more wealthy states,
increases the likelihood that the naval forces capturing pirates will not have nationality
jurisdiction. When there is a mismatch between the nationalities of the pirate capturer
and victim, the capturing country may employ universal jurisdiction.
These distributions of merchant vessel nationality and naval power have produced
practical legal issues for navies patrolling the Horn, speciﬁcally with respect to what
to do with pirates they capture. The absence of a functioning government in Somalia
to which to send the pirates has precluded relying on the Somalis to mete out justice
themselves. Some countries have brought pirates home for trial, but capturing states
have been hesitant to exercise universal jurisdiction, perhaps unwilling to pay for an
exercise in universal jurisdiction on behalf of, say, a Panamanian vessel with a Korean
crew. Universal jurisdiction in this context might appear more like a burden, a kind
of self-sacriﬁce for a global public good. Many have also expressed concern that
Somalis could qualify for refugee status and that it would be impossible to deport
them because of obligations against refoulement.36 Indeed, the lack of a forceful
response to pirates is interpreted by many as indicative of how international law, and
postwar human rights commitments in particular, have constrained the once proud
sovereign state. The status of pirates in the early modern era is a complex topic, but
in many formulations they were distinct from criminals and from enemies.37 If pirates
were once those who could be treated like ‘‘Beasts of Prey,’’38 subject to summary
justice, current practice seems to struggle with their status. The supposed ‘‘enemy of
all’’ turns out to be the bearer of rights. As Douglas Guilfoyle and Andrew Murdoch
write: ‘‘Despite some classical writers’ rhetoric suggesting that pirates are at war with
all humankind, we cannot assume we are at war with pirates.’’39 And while there has
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been discussion of creating an international court for piracy, or extending the jurisdiction of the ICC to include piracy,40 in the absence of such an institutional solution,
many states have preferred simply to let captured pirates go—a practice disparaged as
‘‘catch and release.’’41 Some of these attitudes may be discerned in U.S. conduct: the
United States indicted in federal district court the one surviving pirate who attacked
a U.S. ﬂagship, the Maersk-Alabama, and, more recently, eleven pirates who attacked,
remarkably enough, U.S. naval vessels. But when the United States had universal
jurisdiction, as with pirates it detained aboard an Indian vessel it recovered in 2006,
it chose a novel route: it sent the pirates to Kenya.
The Kenyan Solution: Offshoring International Justice

Indeed, other than those who get released, most of the pirates recently captured off
the Horn of Africa have been delivered to Kenya—about 120 as of this writing—and
Kenya has begun pirate trials in the port city of Mombasa.42 With this innovation, it
would appear that the emergent international response to resurgent piracy is not to
reinstitute a theater of legal terror in the mode of the eighteenth-century British
campaigns but rather to promote a different (and admittedly less dramatic) legal innovation centered on the transfer of pirates from one sovereign to another. At the same
time, the powerful states’ reluctance to try pirates themselves, and the policy of transferring pirates to a third country or simply letting them go, suggests that all may not
be quite so tidy in the house of international law.
At ﬁrst blush, Kenya’s ability to prosecute the Somali pirates even where there is
no connection to Kenya is typically explained as an exercise of universal jurisdiction—and by occasional invocations of the phrase that piracy is a ‘‘crime against
mankind.’’43 Piracy, according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) (1982), more or less reﬂected in Kenyan criminal law, consists in ‘‘any
illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,’’ on the ‘‘high seas,’’
‘‘outside the jurisdiction of any State’’ and ‘‘committed for private ends.’’44 In an
appellate decision afﬁrming jurisdiction over the group of Somalis delivered by the
United States in 2006, the High Court of Kenya at Mombasa opined that even if
Kenya had not ratiﬁed UNCLOS and had not provided for punishment of piracy in
its criminal law, the lower court was ‘‘bound to apply international norms and Instruments since Kenya is a member of the civilized world and not expected to act in
contradiction to expectations of member states of the United Nations.’’45 Yet this was
the same jurisdiction that other states had just declined to exercise, and the Court did
not address the question of whether Kenya was empowered not only to prosecute but
to receive the pirates. There is some doubt—although not one I heard raised in court
nor in the single appellate opinion issued thus far—about whether UNCLOS permits
the transfers. Article 105 of the Convention provides that ‘‘courts of the State which
carried out the seizure’’ may determine punishment—more pointedly, by encouraging
international cooperation, the Security Council resolutions seem, at least in principle,
to endorse the transfer idea.46 All of the coastal states—Kenya, Somalia,
Djibouti—lack warships to catch pirates themselves, but, as one UN representative
diplomatically framed it, ‘‘Some countries provide a navy, others can help with prose-
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cution.’’47 Universal jurisdiction allows everyone to ‘‘help,’’ even if they don’t have
any naval ‘‘assets.’’
Some of the arrested Somalis have objected that Kenya has no business trying
them, mere ﬁsherman who never harmed Kenya. In court I also observed Kenyan
prosecutors assert that their jurisdiction is based on various secret and public Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that Kenya has signed.48 The use of an MOU, instead
of a treaty or other more formal instrument, allows executive branch ofﬁcials to act
with less oversight, especially when the MOU is secret. In this sense, it is one small
part of a struggle over sovereignty within a constitutional order. The U.S. MOU
provides that it is not a ‘‘binding international agreement,’’ which suggests that while
one objective is to deliver the pirates to (Kenyan) justice, another is to ensure that
neither party may seek to enforce the MOU’s terms in court. We might, then, read
the use of MOUs as indicative of the separateness of the parties and of their desire to
preserve their freedom of action. But the opposite reading seems plausible: that the
informality of the process and the use of MOUs indicate just how intimate the parties
are. Neither the Kenyan ambassador to the United States nor a U.S. embassy ofﬁcial
in Nairobi offered an explanation about why the MOU should be secret, although
the latter hinted that it was at the behest of Kenya.
The MOU agreements that I have seen do not purport to confer jurisdiction to
the Kenyan courts, but the notion that they could is interesting. Could Kenya be
exercising jurisdiction transferred from the United States, delegated by a secret
agreement, in addition to or instead of its own free-standing universal jurisdiction?
Even if implausible, this sense of transferable jurisdiction captures an important
feature of the overall program, raising the question of whether Kenya is acting as a
sovereign, or on behalf of one; whether we are studying separate sovereigns, or, rather,
entities nested one within the other. It nicely evokes the uncertainties of juris ventriloquism—are Kenyan courts speaking the law on behalf of Kenya, the United States (or
other ‘‘donor’’ nations), the UN Security Council, humanity, or perhaps all of these
at once? The pirate-trial program is not simply an instance of one sovereign acting
against the pirate; rather, a group of sovereigns is acting together, with universal jurisdiction apparently facilitating their coordination. The MOUs describe and formalize
the processes entailed in the hand-off, while universal jurisdiction allows Kenya to
judge the pirate.
Earlier, I speculated that, with respect to piracy, universal jurisdiction and state
sovereignty could be mutually supportive. That speculation seemed plausible because
in acting against the pirate a state would not—given the UNCLOS deﬁnition of
piracy as being for ‘‘private’’ ends—intrude on the interests of other sovereigns. But
with the transfer program, that is not quite the full story, for Kenya is acting as part
of an order where some kinds of tasks—trying pirates—are apparently better left to
some sovereigns than others. Thus, while the initial conception left the ‘‘sovereign
equality’’ described in the UN Charter undisturbed,49 the transfer program at least
raises an interesting question about a global division of adjudicatory labor, if not about
more substantial inequality. While postcolonial specialization is typically associated
with the provision of migrant labor and the extraction of raw materials, in this instance
what Kenya is selling is access to its jurisdiction.
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While this arrangement might seem to be an arm’s length transaction that serves
formally to enhance Kenya’s sovereign standing and international prestige, it turns
out that the bill of sale has come with a series of strings attached that may result in
precisely the opposite effect. Despite the transfer to Kenya, the various wealthy donor
states have not simply washed their hands of the pirates but rather have used the pirate
trials as an occasion to give Kenyan prisons and courts a close look. A group of
international lawyers from Paris, Lawyers of the World, came to Mombasa to help
defend the pirates and condemned the transfer program for depriving the pirates of
their rights.50 The theater of Kenyan law started to look like one in which the Kenyan
courts, as much as the pirates, were on trial. Instead of being treated as a ‘‘hero’’ of
the international community, as one Kenyan prosecutor said should be happening at
a training session I attended in 2009, Kenya has been informed that its prisons and
courts are perhaps not good enough—even for Somalis. Were the pirates now vehicles
for international standards, standards that Kenya, as is often said, does not meet in
the treatment of its own citizens? Instead of a dumping program, was this to be a
program to elevate Kenya to world standards?51
While Kenya clearly wanted ﬁnancial support in exchange for undertaking the
pirate trials, the donor states have insisted on monitoring such assistance closely,
concerned about corruption. One consultant working in Mombasa spoke to me of
Kenyan ofﬁcials as ‘‘children seeking candy.’’ A representative of a naval mission
described how annoyed the local detectives were that he would not buy them a new
vehicle but rather was planning to provide a maintenance contract with a local
mechanic to ﬁx the many broken-down vehicles in their lot. A U.S. embassy ofﬁcial,
while offering training on how to organize a litigation ﬁle, promised to personally
deliver paper and a ﬁle cabinet. I asked a Kenyan prosecutor why cash could not be
sent to Mombasa instead of driving reams of paper from Nairobi, and he said that the
foreign states did not trust the Kenyans. Before signing an MOU agreement with the
EU, Kenya is said to have ‘‘presented a 12-page wish-list of expensive items and money
for retreats.’’ It was not only the Kenyans who looked a bit awkward: ‘‘One of the
ofﬁcials described diplomats running around Nairobi buying up color printers.’’52
Donor states thus transfer pirates to Kenya yet seem unable to let them go, concerned
about Kenyan standards and equipment. And the Kenyans, understandably, are
unwilling to let the foreign donors depart without offering some aid. That these
awkward transactions are ambivalently situated as benevolent gifts, reciprocal
exchanges, or unseemly transfers nicely articulates the complexity and variability of
the bonds between Kenya and the donors. In particular, these transactional ambivalences articulate the question of whether these are bonds between sovereign equals or
patron and client.
The exercise of universal jurisdiction can be read as an altruistic act—why, after
all, should a state expend its resources prosecuting individuals who have no nexus to
it? But the pirate transfers and trials have been subject in Kenya to a variety of
readings: that Kenya is sacriﬁcing itself as a hero for the international community;
that it is being exploited as a dumping ground by wealthy states; that it negotiated a
good deal for itself and is exploiting states too inhibited to kill pirates and too indifferent to try them. Reﬂecting the instability of these readings, Kenyan ofﬁcials began

60

Humanity

Spring 2011

................. 17987$

$CH5

02-14-11 15:50:18

PS

PAGE 60

to rethink the deals they had struck. The media speculated that Kenya had been
‘‘coerced’’ and, in the words of a government minister, ‘‘short-changed.’’53 Speaking
in April 2010, Kenyan Attorney General Wako announced the end of the pirate
program. He described an ‘‘inherent contradiction’’ in the use of Kenya to try pirates,
saying of the foreign nations that ‘‘they keep on rubbishing our judicial system . . .
Why then are these countries afraid to prosecute the pirates, arrested by their naval
forces in the high seas?’’54 He continued: ‘‘As soon as they give us the pirates, they
dump them here and forget about what happened.’’ Instead of leading an international
charge against the enemy of all, Kenya found itself, as the attorney general put it,
‘‘stand[ing] alone.’’55 Kenya’s withdrawal prompted more talk of an international
tribunal, and there are some signs that capturing states are again thinking about trying
pirates at home. Kenya’s announcement came within days of the decision of the International Criminal Court to permit the ICC prosecutor to proceed with an investigation in Kenya. One rumor claimed that the attorney general himself was on the list
of possible perpetrators.56 But a month later, in June 2010, Kenya announced that it
was back in the pirate trial business—the EU had pledged more funding and paid for
a new courtroom at the prison where the pirates were being held outside Mombasa.57
Kenya has imported a struggle over the pirate previously internal to the capturing
states—the struggle over whether the pirate is really no longer the enemy of all,
whether he truly had been assimilated to the twentieth century’s regime of rights. In
this affair, we see states struggling with that transformation in public law. I believe we
can interpret the pirate-transfer program as an attempt to displace the tension that
such transformation creates: questions about who speaks the law and on whose behalf.
This tension was exported to Kenya along with the pirates, which is hardly the deal,
one suspects, that Kenya had in mind.
The International Criminal Court

The judges decided. There will be justice in Kenya. To contribute to the
prevention of crimes during the next election we must proceed promptly.
—ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo58
While Kenya was busy importing apparently impoverished Somali pirates, it seemed
likely to begin exporting to the Hague well-to-do perpetrators of crimes against
humanity. In the December 2007 election, Kenya seemed set for a peaceful transition.59 The opposition party was leading the vote count by a large margin. But at
the last minute, the incumbent was declared the winner and hastily sworn in. Ethnically organized violence broke out as opposition party supporters attacked those of the
incumbent, which was followed by reprisals. Over one thousand people were killed,
widespread sexual assaults took place, and hundreds of thousands were displaced from
their homes. Some commentators saw genocide looming, while Kenya’s main donor
states applied increasing pressure on the country’s leadership. Former UN secretary
general Koﬁ Annan negotiated a deal in February 2008 in which there would be a
coalition government: the incumbent would be president and the opponent would ﬁll
the newly created post of prime minister. A new constitution would be drafted. But
would those who instigated and led the violence be punished? On this question, the
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Kenyan political class has been unable to establish a way forward. The ICC is poised
to prosecute a few of the key perpetrators for crimes against humanity.
Individual states can act against perpetrators of crimes against humanity under
universal jurisdiction. The UN Security Council has also created courts to prosecute
offenses against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, among other cases.
The ICC offers another mechanism for representing and defending the interests of
injured humanity. It has, under the Rome Statute, independent international legal
personality, and thus, technically, it is not simply a creature of the UN or the state
system. States ‘‘accept’’ the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes of universal jurisdiction by
becoming a party to the statute, which limits the Court’s jurisdiction to ‘‘the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’’: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression—not, we might
note, piracy or stealing an election.60 Simultaneously authorized by states and yet
reaching beyond them to universal values, the ICC answers the question of who is
authorized to act in the interests of ‘‘justice’’ on behalf of humanity.
The conjunction of pirate trials and ICC prosecutions in Kenya also presents an
opportunity to reﬂect on the historical evolution of universal jurisdiction. Eugene
Kontorovich has argued that the post–World War II extension of universal jurisdiction
over war crimes and crimes against humanity was built off of the universal jurisdiction
applied to piracy, all of them connected by their alleged ‘‘heinousness.’’61 But Kontorovich also notes that, historically, piratical acts were not always seen as especially
heinous and indeed were often sponsored by states. Thus piracy, he concludes, is a
‘‘hollow foundation’’ for more recent versions of universal jurisdiction. Yet
heinousness, as Kontorovich also recognizes, is not the only way to conceive the link
between old and new. For instance, as another author notes, there are arguments
about practical matters of administration: on the high seas and during war, there is
often a ‘‘lack of any adequate judicial system operating on the spot where the crime
takes place—in the case of piracy it is because the acts are on the high seas and in the
case of war crimes because of a chaotic condition or irresponsible leadership in time
of war.’’62 Even so, universal jurisdiction with respect to piracy seems a clear expression
of an international order based on state sovereignty over territory; the enemy of all is
outside the state. The ICC’s version of universal jurisdiction, by contrast, seems to be
about ﬁnding the enemy of all at the heart of the state. Thus we may wish to concur
with Kontorovich in seeing a disjuncture between old and new, between the prosecutions of the pirate and the perpetrator of crimes against humanity. One ampliﬁes the
voice of state sovereignty; the other seems to mute it. Yet this narrative of disjuncture
does not confront the features of postcolonial sovereignty discussed earlier—namely,
the decoupling of legal sovereignty from power. The co-location of the pirate trials
and the ICC in Kenya encapsulates the position of the postcolonial state, and the
various ways in which such states do not enjoy what we classically think of as sovereignty. In other words, to see the ICC as undercutting state sovereignty presumes a
conception of sovereignty that may not be applicable to many states.
But is Kenya really being denied its ability to engage in an act of sovereign selfcreation and self-governance by the ICC? It had ratiﬁed the ICC Treaty in 2005 but
failed to pass implementing legislation before the 2007 elections. The government’s
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initial efforts to punish offenders were rejected by Parliament in February 2009, which
prompted the Commission of Inquiry—a body established after the violence—to
transmit names of possible perpetrators of crimes against humanity to the ICC in July
2009. Meeting with the ICC prosecutor, an ofﬁcial Kenyan delegation agreed that
within twelve months Kenya would either establish some form of accountability or
refer the matter to the ICC. Some weeks later, the government announced a plan that
didn’t involve sending the matter to the ICC.63 Kenya had declined, we might say, to
throw its voice to the prosecutor, and for the ﬁrst time, the prosecutor sought to bring
a case without a referral from a state or the Security Council. In relying on Kenya’s
earlier consent to the statute, the prosecutor had appropriated the Kenyan state’s
voice, while at the same time speaking in the voice of aggrieved humanity. In a sense,
therefore, the ICC prosecutor is both outside and inside Kenyan state government.64
We might speculate that the Kenyan political classes are relying on the ICC to act.
Were this the case, Kenya might appear to have abdicated self-government, and
therefore sovereignty in a robust sense. The Kenyan president and cabinet contemplated withdrawal from the ICC but backed away, perhaps because some donor
support is tied to ICC membership.65 Is Kenya speaking through the ICC? Or is it,
most crudely, donor states that are speaking the law by insisting on Kenya’s continued
participation with the ICC? A case could be made for each—and that is the point;
the international system provides a structure where it is not always clear who is
speaking on behalf of whom. The ambiguities of the relationship between Kenya and
the ICC require us to reframe the questions about possible conﬂicts between state
sovereignty and universal jurisdiction. If Kenyan sovereignty does not live up to an
idealized conception of sovereignty as a kind of autonomous self-creation (in either
the pirate trials or ICC prosecutions), neither does Kenya appear only as a mere
appendage or colony of larger imperial states and global structures.
Mob Justice

Justice became an item for sale leaving it inaccessible to a majority of poor
Kenyans. One consequence of the many years of corruption was the increasing
resort by many Kenyans to what has been popularly called ‘‘mob justice’’—that is
lynchings of criminal suspects.
—Mutuma Ruteere (writing about President Daniel arap Moi’s years in ofﬁce)66
My two stories about universal jurisdiction draw attention to external actors and
donors, even as they problematize who is ‘‘outside’’ the Kenyan state and in what
sense we should think of the state as sovereign. Both stories concerned, in part, the
shortcomings of the Kenyan justice system. Apparently it is unable to bring to justice
the planners of the postelection violence, and the pirate trials generated concern about
Kenya’s ability to handle those cases. But what about more everyday offenses? How
does the tension between sovereignty and universal jurisdiction manifest itself in the
internal relations between state and population? Many commentators suggest that the
Kenyan courts and police do not provide basic security and that—like the payment
for pirate trials—ﬁnancial bargaining for justice takes place between the state and its
own citizens. Those who cannot pay, says Mutuma Ruteere in my epigraph, have
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sometimes resorted to a form of self-help: mob justice. Mob justice describes a form
of action in which citizens spontaneously form groups and publicly, under a claim of
justice, take (sometimes lethal) punishment into their own hands. Most simply, it
raises the question of whether and in what sense the Kenyan state has jurisdiction over
Kenya, and whether in mob justice we see another kind ‘‘universal jurisdiction,’’
whereby ordinary people are empowered to act. It suggests another instance of the
mobility of the sovereign voice and its ability to speak the law, as citizens take up
some of the core sovereign decisions over punishment and over life and death. While
I am not able to do justice to the complex topic of mob justice, in this section I
discuss it to contextualize the analysis of the pirate trials and the ICC.
In Kenya, what is called (in English) ‘‘mob justice’’ is a socially recognized form
of action. It is widely explained, by scholars and participants, as a response to state
incapacity to provide law and order:
The average period of a case in Kenya is 4–5 years. This has led to lack of conﬁdence in the judicial machinery, with people often giving up their rights after
weighing the time and money costs of the whole process. It has also led to the
development of some alternative undesirable extra-legal phenomena that is [sic]
antithetical to the rule of law such as ‘‘mob-justice,’’ where communities seek
justice for themselves by communally executing suspects on the spot. This has
been attributed to repeated failure of system [sic] to work with the result of criminals ﬁnding their way back to the streets and communities shortly after arrest.67
Writing about vigilantism in Kenya more generally, David Anderson describes it as a
response to steeply rising crime rates since the 1980s, ‘‘rapid growth in the urban
population, . . . acute housing shortages, declining economic prosperity, rising urban
unemployment and the collapse of many institutions of municipal government.’’68
Mob justice raises a fundamental question about jurisdiction—who is it that really
speaks the law in Kenya? On the streets of Nairobi, is it petty criminals, gangs, or the
‘‘mob’’? But the matter is more complex; there are a range of other actors in Kenya
who rely on the failure of the state, even some who are themselves state ofﬁcials. ‘‘The
justiﬁcation is often given,’’ writes Philip Alston, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, that ‘‘the failures of the justice system leave the police with no
alternative but to administer ‘justice’ directly by executing those who they ‘know’ to
be guilty and who, if arrested, would either never be prosecuted or, if charged, would
be acquitted.’’69 The same claim is made for the gangs such as the Mungiki that are
now hunted by the police but were previously deployed by politicians.70 In mob justice
we encounter a fragment, although perhaps the least institutionalized, of a larger
constellation of nonstate violence—and, more to the point, violence that blurs the
lines between state and nonstate action.
Between the Mob and the ICC

And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done,
every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is
no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution
of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
—John Locke, Two Treatises of Government71
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The degree to which the postelection violence was organized by the state or other
organizations is an important issue in the ICC’s claim that crimes against humanity
occurred in Kenya. Violence became central to the electoral process as soon as Kenya
agreed—under pressure from donors—to hold multiparty elections in 1992. Adam
Ashforth writes that President Daniel Arap Moi ‘‘organized squads of young men to
attack Kikuyu residents in the Rift Valley . . . to drive out potential opposition voters
and intimidate those who remained . . . Moi won himself ten more years as president
by means of ‘clashes’ such as these (though he also bribed voters and ofﬁcials, repressed
dissenters, and rigged his way through elections). At each election since 1992 . . .
ethnic clashes have occurred in the Rift Valley.’’72 What distinguished the postelection
violence of 2007–8, in Ashforth’s estimation, was that it was deployed not only to win
the election but also to reshape national space, to create ethnically cleansed regions.73
One of the questions raised by mob justice—and the other deployments of extralegal
violence by the police, gangs, and parties in the electoral cycle—is whether it is
accurate (or relevant) to see these acts of violence as expressing the failure of the
Kenyan state to achieve a monopoly over violence in its territory. Many of those actors
are not simply criminals enjoying impunity; some assert a link to state authority—like
pirates of an earlier era licensed as privateers. The blurriness seems relevant here,
because some of them—according to the ICC—are running the government.
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber faced the issue, to put it too crudely, of whether the
violence was that of the state or the mob—whether the mob was being used as the
vehicle through which elites were speaking or whether ordinary people were in fact
leading the elites. In other words, was the violence a result of a ‘‘State or organizational
policy,’’ as the ICC Statute requires to assume jurisdiction?74 In his dissent, Judge
Kaul wrote that the ‘‘overall picture is characterized by chaos, anarchy, a collapse of
State authority in most parts of the country and almost total failure of law
enforcement agencies.’’75 There was not ‘‘an ‘organization’ meeting the prerequisites
of structure, membership, duration and means to attack the civilian population.’’76
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights expressed a similar opinion.77
The judges in the majority, by contrast, approved the prosecutors’ request to proceed
with an investigation of Kenya absent a referral from the state on the determination
that a ‘‘number of the attacks were planned, directed or organized by various groups
including local leaders, businessmen and politicians associated with the two leading
political parties, as well as by members of the police force.’’78 The violence was organized, but it is not clear that even the majority thinks there was a ‘‘State or organizational policy’’ behind it; there seems to be something comforting in the view that
there is someone in charge who can be held accountable—some ‘‘organization’’ (or
the state) that used a broader public as a vehicle for its ‘‘policy.’’
I suspect that we must take the term justice as seriously as the term mob. David
Luban argues that since it is human beings, not states, who are offended by crimes
against humanity, we should recognize a ‘‘vigilante jurisdiction’’ over the offender,
which ‘‘carries the implication that criminals against humanity are anyone’s fair
target.’’79 Fearing ‘‘lynch-mob justice,’’ however, Luban would delegate this jurisdiction to national or international tribunals.80 The crimes the Kenyan mob punishes,
often larceny, are not crimes against humanity in the ICC’s sense. But the absence of
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protection against crime in general does generate a context where the offended party
is a broader community, which, like Luban’s humanity, is not represented by an
institution. The Kenyan courts apparently do not speak for the injured community.
Does the mob pick up where the state leaves off ? Is this form of violence direct,
nondelegated action?
The conditions that make the mob possible are the weakness and illegality of the
state combined with its continued presence. The state fails to act as classic sovereign;
but it continues to occupy that space. The potential symmetry between the mob
(bringing accountability to the petty criminal) and the ICC (bringing accountability
to the elite perpetrator) rests on the inability of the Kenyan state to provide those two
forms of accountability. Both purport to be against impunity and to advance justice.
The ICC seems set to pursue elite actors within Kenya; the mob pursues the nonelite
on the streets. That there is a vigilante group called ‘‘the Hague’’ suggests that the
symmetry between the ICC and popular justice is appreciated by some actors in
Kenya.81
Perhaps it is the victim of mob justice who is the ‘‘enemy of all,’’ the one who is
beyond the law of the state and is, therefore, subject to some other form of justice.
Mob justice reproduces the structural relation of all against one that we see asserted
with respect to pirates under the state system. And perhaps the law of the sea, articulating as it does the sovereignty-free high seas, is suggestive for thinking about security
and justice on land in postcolonial states, where the sovereign interior has various
oceanic, sovereignty-free aspects. Indeed, mob justice challenges the dichotomy
between the sovereign land and the sovereignty-free sea. A more empirically accurate
conceptualization of both land and sea might be—as Lauren Benton says of the geography of empire—that there are pathways, ‘‘corridors’’ and moments of sovereignty.82
Conclusion: Postcolonial Piracy

Considered together, the pirate trials, the ICC’s investigations, and mob violence in
Kenya help to illuminate the fraught nature of postcolonial sovereignty. It is hard to
imagine a greater gulf than that between the Somali pirate and those likely to be in
the ICC’s cross-hairs. The pirates are nonelite foot soldiers; the ICC’s suspects
important public ﬁgures. We might take the simultaneous appearance of our two
stories to signify that the oldest and newest conception of universal jurisdiction can
co-exist, and that pirate and tyrant have ﬁnally been recognized as the ‘‘enemies of
all,’’ properly punished for their heinous acts. By contrast, perhaps the common thread
of universal jurisdiction tracks major transformations, inversions even, in our ideas of
universal jurisdiction, our global spatial order and the meaning of sovereignty. Indeed,
Kenya’s tentative decision to withdraw from the piracy program, as the ICC moved
forward, underscored the political tension between the two usages of universal jurisdiction in the same political space—that is, that the international community could
not count on the Kenyan government simultaneously to cooperate on piracy while at
the same time allowing some of its own members to be subject to the ICC. And yet,
when provided with additional ﬁnancial support, the Kenyan courts went back to
work on the pirate cases in support of the international order.
To properly evaluate the changes in universal jurisdiction from piracy to crimes
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against humanity, those changes must themselves be mapped onto the roughly
contemporaneous transformations in the meaning of sovereignty after World War II
and decolonization. This implies a continuity with colonialism: just as the colonial
power could exercise jurisdiction over subjects, the newer universal jurisdiction
preserves that possibility—at least for the ICC. Thus the old and new may ﬁt together,
but in a complex way. We might then see the stories from Kenya as a pithy articulation
of the position that postcolonial states occupy—useful to wealthy states as a place to
dump pirates, a sovereign who can loan out its ‘‘sovereign’’ powers for a fee, while,
with respect to matters of higher politics, subject to the oversight of ICC. Both forms
of jurisdiction can be understood as dedicated to preserving the international order.
It is just that the role of sovereignty in the international order has changed—from a
global regime where sovereignty and power were tightly linked, to one where the mere
status of sovereign may tell us very little about a polity.
But the analogy to colonial structures is, I suspect, too easy, offering a perverse
comfort in thinking that nothing has changed, that there is an order—however
offensive. Are we certain that the boundaries of the ‘‘Kenyan’’ sovereign should or do
not include the ICC prosecutor and those other agents of justice, the mob? And when
we look at the other actors, such as the states dropping off the pirates, how are we to
see their ‘‘sovereignty’’? They too seem bound to law, simply seeking an easy route to
compliance, and this undercuts any simple neocolonial reading.
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